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In the U@A= @outh ABrica= -hina= Cra>il and man< other countries= the spontaneous actions oB 
entrepreneurs have spa:ned a ne: ur2an product Dprivatel< governed ur2an neigh2orhoodsE that 
:ill have a maFor impact on the Borm and Bunction oB Buture cities. 1hether this phenomenon is 
economicall< and politicall< sustaina2le or not is the su2Fect oB this paper. 1 
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oppositio+( to t0e eCCicie+cB arAume+ts Cor Aati+A a+d priMate AoMer+a+ce( N0ic0 are ?ased o+ 
t0e assumptio+ t0at t0e pu?lic proMisio+ oC serMices leaMes pote+tial NelCare Aai+s u+realiOed 
JPoldMarB 1QQRK. 
 
!s $et, no author has crossed these lines o2 de3ate to anal$4e the sustaina3ilit$ o2 the private 
cit$. In attempting this, ;e appl$ a theoretical approach that vie;s the private residential 
communit$ as a club economy to anal$4e t0e pla++i+A a+d ma+aAi+A practices oC G1Q Aated 
reside+tial commu+ities i+ t0e Los S+Aeles area <=e3ster >00>@.
G
 6e Cirst exami+e 0oN priMate 
commu+ities miA0t ?e proUsustai+a?ilitB tools. Vext( Ne co+sider N0et0er priMate AoMer+a+ce 
puts ur?a+ eWuili?rium at risX. Pi+allB( Ne a+alBOe 0oN priMate AoMer+a+ce miA0t i+deed lead to 
u+sustai+a?le local ur?a+ political eco+omies.  
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90is sectio+ exami+es 0oN ur?a+ territorial e+closure miA0t Bield sustai+a?le ?e+eCits to t0e citB. 
90ere are seMeral u+derlBi+A 0Bpot0eses. /ompared to mu+icipalUscale AoMer+a+ce( microUscale 
collectiMe decisio+ maXi+A is made o+ t0e ?asis oC superior i+Cormatio+ a+d t0eoreticallB leads to 
a closer Cit ?etNee+ t0e dema+d Cor a+d supplB oC local pu?lic Aoods a+d serMices. 8eco+dlB( 
most local pu?lic Aoods are co+sumed ?B su?Usets oC t0e Nider pu?lic a+d are t0ereCore ?etter 
supplied as Yclu? AoodsY.
3
 60ere a Aood is co+sumed as part oC a Yclu?Y ?ut produced as a pu?lic 
Aood Cor t0e N0ole citB( co+Clicts oC i+terest Nill i+eMita?lB arise( tBpicallB leadi+A to oMer 
co+sumptio+. 9erritorial e+closure Ji.e. co+trolli+A accessK is a mec0a+ism Cor preMe+ti+A oMerU
co+sumptio+ a+d premature deAradatio+ oC ur?a+ pu?lic Aoods. 90e alter+atiMes to territorial 
e+closure are reAulatio+( taxatio+( a+d i+Mestme+t( all oC N0ic0 i+cur costs a+d 0aMe side eCCects. 
/o+trolli+A access J+ot +ecessarilB restricti+A access( N0ic0 is diCCere+tK maB ?e a less costlB a+d 
more eCCectiMe mec0a+ism Cor preserMi+A reside+tial WualitB oC liCe.  
 
90irdlB( reorAa+iOi+A a pu?lic citB i+to a citB oC clu?s maB i+crease Cu+ds Cor collectiMe Aoods. 
60e+ propertB riA0ts oMer collectiMe Aoods are clearlB deCi+ed( Nit0 respo+si?ilities a+d 
lia?ilities esta?lis0ed ?B laN( t0ere is a stro+Aer i+ce+tiMe to rei+Mest. $iMe+ t0e AroNt0 oC priMate 
commu+ities( it is clear t0at ma+B citiOe+s are Nilli+A to ?e Zdou?le taxed[ to acWuire ?etter 
e+Miro+me+tal co+ditio+s a+d serMices. \u+icipalities capitaliOe o+ t0is extra source oC reMe+ue 
?B oCCUloadi+A respo+si?ilities to ]ome %N+ers Sssociatio+s J]%SsK. %+ t0e ot0er 0a+d( ]%Ss 




^e?ates a?out Aated commu+ities are more a?out local territorial AoMer+a+ce t0a+ a?out Aates. 
_.8. ]ome %N+ers Sssociatio+s are microUAoMer+me+ts Nit0 t0ree ?asic c0aracteristics` elected 
?oards act as +eiA0?or0ood decisio+ maXers( co+tracts AoMer+ reside+t[s ?e0aMior( a+d mo+t0lB 
Cees Ci+a+ce local ame+ities a+d serMices. 7B GHHH( oMer 1a b oC t0e _8 0ousi+A Nas co+tai+ed 
Nit0i+ t0ese commo+ i+terest deMelopme+ts( a+d t0e +um?er oC u+its i+ t0ese priMatelB AoMer+ed 
reside+tial sc0emes rose Crom cH1(HHH i+ 1QcH to 1I.3 millio+ i+ 1QQd J\cee+Oie GHH3( GHHaa( 
GHHa?K. &+ GHHG t0e /ommu+itB Sssociatio+ oC Smerica estimated t0at Rc millio+ Smerica+s 
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Lere living in G31(000 communitB associations and that N0O oC all neL homes in maPor cities 
belonged to communitB associations J$lasQe( FrantQ( and 6ebster G00GK.  
 
The rapid groLth oC this phenomenon provides qualiCied support Cor the libertarian politicalU
economB vieL that the public provision oC collective goods and services is ineCCicient. This vieL 
holds that bureaucracies create diseconomies oC scale and are LasteCul. &n part( these 
ineCCiciencies are eVplained bB the lacW oC competition to checW overgroLth and the inCormation 
handicap bureaucracies Cace in the absence oC prices. Xs a result( cities oversupplB public goods( 
sWeLing their distribution toLard the most poLerCul interests. These researchers see private 
communities as a more politicallB and CinanciallB sustainable institution. For eVample( since 
18IZ( residents on private streets in 8t. Louis have Cinanced their oLn collective goods Jtrash 
collection( street sLeeping( securitB( etc.K according to their perceived value. 8ince public 
governments must estimate inCrastructure and services demand( theB risW under or oversupplBing 
the marWet. Furthermore( manB oC the investments made bB [%Xs Jor in the commercial sphere( 
bB malls( science parWs( etc.K can be capitaliQed in land rent. \ot onlB do oLners have an 
incentive to invest in their local environments( but also theB can recover investment costs Crom 
rents JFoldvarB 199^K. 
 
$enerallB( scarce resources are better enclosed than unenclosed J6ebster G00NK. %pen access 
resources suCCer Crom overuse( and those that are LellUpreserved incur high costs J[ardin 19I8K.
 ^
 
&ndeed( a tragedB oC the urban commons is plaBed out in the public spaces( services( and 
inCrastructure oC cities throughout the Lorld. This occurs Cor tLo reasons. FolloLing [ardin( 
resources that are governed bB shared useUrights tend to deplete through unrestrained 
competition. Xs this happens( demand Cor reassigning rights structure to protect against complete 
resource dissipation increases J7arQel 199Z( 6ebster G003_ 6ebster and Lai G003K. These 
tendencies are observed at all spatial scales and in all Winds oC resources( such as \&`7a 
movements( communitB groups Lho lobbB Cor sloL groLth policies( and governments Lho 
introduce road pricing.  
 
Responsive and resourceCul governments attempt to manage overuse bB imposing regulations( 
raising the capacitB oC congested inCrastructure( and improving Cacilities and services. [oLever( 
as rising incomes result in higher eVpectations and increasinglB diCCerentiated tastes( even the 
most responsive governments have little hope oC managing citiQen demands in a LaB that avoids 
premature depletion. /ivic goods and services provided through taVation Lill alLaBs be 
undersupplied( either through limited taV Cunds or rising eVpectations.  
 
\ot onlB do residential clubs contribute to the Cinancial sustainabilitB oC urban governance( but 
also theB provide a LaB oC preserving( protecting and enhancing the burban commonsc.
 N
 The 
introduction oC road pricing in /entral London illustrates these trends. 6hat Las CormerlB a 
public good subPect to overuse and degradation Las converted overnight to a club good in Lhich 
the user paBs. `embership is on a paB as Bou use basis_ Cees are set to balance demand and 
supplB oC central area road space. 7B assigning propertB rights to road space( the municipalitB 
has loLered demand and increased revenues Cor road investment and management( Cactors Lhich 




Fiscal sustainability 1 the cash co5 factor 
LE $%I', Renaud, and Chris J. WEBSTER. "$ated communities, sustainable cities and a tragedy of the urban commons." !ritical 
)lannin+, no. 1E F Summer GHH6 (GHH6).  
 
 
$ated neighborhoods also enable public authorities to manage groMth Mith greater fiscal 
sustainability. Figure 1 shoMs that gating is highly correlated Mith fiscal gaps progressively 
experienced by local government bodies. 
 
Rolling Qills (19E5) and Bradbury (19E8) Mere the first gated communities in Southern 
California. After World War II, these Mere accompanied by MellVWnoMn developments such as 
Qidden Qills (195H) and the original Leisure World at Seal Beach (1946). Although there Mere 
1,7HH gated housing units in the Los Angeles area by 196H, the development of enclaves such as 
Leisure World (1965) and Canyon LaWe (1968) resulted in 19,9HH gated units by 197H (Le $oix 
GHHE). Since developments after 197H Mere smaller, the groMth rate decreased: E1,HHH gated 
housing units existed in 198H[ 5E,HHH in 199H[ and 8H,HHH in GHHH. In GHHH, these units 
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!igure (. The diffusion of gated communities in the Los Angeles area. 
 
The regional diCCusion oC gated communities is related to su?ur?an groLth( an endemic antiM
Ciscal posture( and municipal Cragmentation JFigure 2K. These three conditions have Crustrated 
local planning eCCortsQ although ur?an spraLl has generated an increased need Cor inCrastructural 
development( propertB taR limits and Cragmentation have reduced local governmentsS Cinancial 
resources.
 8
 Us a result( gated communities( Lhich ?ring LealthB taRpaBers at minimal cost( have 
?ecome the perCect cash coL Cor local municipalities JVcWenXie 1YYZK.  
 
Table 1. A dominant market share in the fastest gro;ing areas of the Los Angeles region 
!! !!
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Ls Table 1 shoMs, gated communities noM represent a maOor share oC the marPet in the Castest 
groMing parts oC the Los Lngeles region, especiallB in %range and Riverside counties Mhere the 
population has boomed since the 1RI0s. 8ince 1RR0, the groMth rate has remained high, 
averaging 1ST betMeen 1RR0 and 2000. 7B providing their oMn securitB, inCrastructure and 
services, these developments reduce public Cinancial responsibilitB. Ls compensation, 
homeoMners are granted exclusive access to their neighborhoods, a condition Mhich enhances 
location rent and positivelB aCCects propertB values JLacour-Little and WalpeXXi 2001Y Le $oix 
2002K. Thus, these developments are instrumental in transCerring the cost oC urban spraMl Crom 
public authorities to private developers and homeoMners.  
 
Llso, to the extent that gating increases propertB values, a municipalitBZs propertB tax revenues 
also increase. [ot onlB are cities exempt Crom paBing Cor most oC private communitiesZ securitB, 
service and inCrastructure, but also rising propertB values increases Cunds to paB Cor enhanced 
public programs and goods. This illustrates the point Me have alreadB made – that the club 
neighborhood is an institution that can help sustain citB groMth bB unlocPing more resources Cor 
collective goods and services. This maB cease to be the case iC club residents Mere able to opt out 
oC certain tax municipal obligations, but even then, theB maB be Milling to paB more Cor private 
urban governance than Cor public urban governance, Oust as private some Camilies are Milling to 




&n /alabasas JMest oC Los LngelesK, Mhere 30T oC the housing stocP is locPed behind gates, the 
/itB reinvests 13T oC its operational budget in landscaping and leisure centers, such as a public 
golC course. Lll oC these Cacilities are Mithin the vicinitB oC /alabasas ParP, the main gated area. 
This represents a complex sBnergB in Mhich the municipal government derives Ciscal beneCit 
Crom private enclaves Mhile subsidiXing the provision oC leisure amenities to enclave residents 
JLe $oix 200^K. Public oCCicials and developers acPnoMledge not onlB the Ciscal quid-pro-quos 
oC private neighborhoods, but also the beneCits oC increased densitB, Mhich preserves open space 
and enables architectural diversitB J7en-4oseph 200SK.  
 
Llthough some developers are able to maintain proCits Mhile producing environmentallB 
sustainable and aCCordable developments, the vast maOoritB perceive that planning regulations, 
such as re_uirements Cor open space, land dedications, and Mater sBstems laBout and hooPup 
Cees, are excessive JWc`enXie 2003Y 7en-4oseph 200SK. &ndeed, private communities proliCerate 
under several interesting dBnamics, involving on one hand, public governments enlarging their 
tax-base and on the other hand, developers seePing to oCCset the burden oC public planning 
regulations through Clexible design Mithin private subdivisions J7en-4oseph 200SK. 
 
Economic sustainability 7 the functional integration factor 
 
6hen a high-income gated communitB Mas built next to a poor s_uatter communitB on the 
outsPirts oC 8antiago, /hile a CeM Bears ago, loMer-income residents Melcomed their neM 
neighbors as sources oC emploBment. The neM development also brought trunP Mater, seMerage 
and other utilities to the location, services that the s_uatters had lobbBing Cor unsuccessCullB Cor 
Bears J8alcedo and Torres 200SK. &n turn, the Mealthier residents valued their poorer neighbors, 
Mho supplied essential trades and services. 8urprisinglB, this ethnographic studB documented 
that inter-communitB relations Mere much healthier than the intra-gated communitB relations 
!" $%&'( )en,ud( ,nd /0ris 4. 6"789"). :$,ted co>>unities( sust,in,?@e cities ,nd , tr,AedB of t0e ur?,n co>>ons.: !ritical 
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JA,ted residents did not ,@L,Bs spe,N Le@@ of e,c0 ot0er ?ut spoNe Le@@ of t0eir poorer 
neiA0?orsK.  
 
&t ,@so is possi?@e t0,t A,tinA( ?B cre,tinA , c@oser proOi>itB of inco>e Aroups( incre,ses tr,des in 
so>e ur?,n ,re,s P especi,@@B in >unicip,@ities Lit0 0iA0 @eQe@s of inco>e seAreA,tion. 90us( 
A,tinA >,B >,Ne , citB >ore econo>ic,@@B sust,in,?@e ?B reducinA tr,Qe@ dist,nce. Ror inst,nce( 
>,nB co>p@eOes in Sort0ern 8,n Rern,ndo T,@@eB Jne,r 8B@>,r( Sort0 Ui@@s ,nd V,nor,>, 
/itBK ,nd ,au.man 0 1roadWs sc0e>es in Sort0ern %r,nAe countB J!ori !,ne in $,rden $roQe 
,nd 8toneA,te in Xn,0ei>( deQe@oped in 2HHHK ,re s>,@@ infi@@ deQe@op>ents of @ess t0,n YH units 
or se>iZdet,c0ed residenti,@ co>p@eOes retrofitted Lit0 A,tes in ,re,s L0ere propertB Q,@ues ,re 
0iA0@B Q,ried. 90ese ,re >ost@B in Uisp,nic or Xsi,n neiA0?or0oods( 0e,Qi@B ur?,ni[ed durinA 
t0e >idZD\IHs( ,nd deQe@opers noL use A,tes ,nd U%Xs ,s , reneL,@ too@ Jsee RiAure EK. 
XccordinA to re,@Zest,te ,Aents in !oriZ!,ne ,nd 8toneA,te( t0ese ,re ]eOecutiQe co>>unities^ 
,ppe,@inA to t0e ]sno? Q,@ue^ of prospectiQe ?uBers. 90eB Lere oriAin,@@B t,rAeted ,t et0nic 
nic0es in t0e 0ousinA >,rNet ,nd >iA0t 0e@p to Neep Le,@t0ier residents in t0ese cities. &f t0is 
0,ppens( t0eB >,B incre,se @oc,@ _o? opportunities for eOistinA residents ,s 0iA0er inco>e 
oLners de>,nd >ore s0ops ,nd serQices( , process ,@re,dB o?serQed in !ondonWs inner citB 
7orouA0s. 
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Ls eMplored a?ove, a citB oC clu?s maB ?e more sustaina?le than a pu?lic citB. PoQever, there 
are manB QellRCounded arguments against private neigh?orhoods as Qell. In this section Qe 
consider Qhether preRemptive neigh?orhood protection carries risSs Cor other citB residents, 
Cactors Qhich potentiallB maB render ur?an areas unsta?le and chaotic.  
 
 /ities are landRuse sBstems consisting oC interpenetrating private and pu?lic spaces governed ?B 
compleM patterns oC propertB rights JScott 1T80K. The production oC ur?an space ?B oQners oC 
capital Jdevelopers, manuCacturers, homeoQnersK means individuallB optimal, su?Vective 
decisions have a social cost. Private transactions generate spillover eCCects, such as material and 
auditorB pollution, road congestion, and underused land. From one point oC vieQ, these 
eMternalities are marSet Cailures: since marSet ?ased transactions Cail to give them a price, third 
parties ineCCicientlB ?ear the costs. Zeigh?orhood clu??ing is a private, preRemptive solution to 
marSet Cailure. PoQever, although it supplies residents Qith greater poQer to reduce spillovers, it 
also imposes eMternalities on its neigh?ors.  
 
Long.term system stability: status exhibition vs. segregation 
 
Resident Ciltering occurs Qhen restrictive covenants and propertB values limit potential 
candidates Cor homeoQnership. The result is neigh?orhood homogeni[ation ?B Qealth, age, race 
and status. 6hether the homogeni[ing eCCects oC privatelB governed communities are greater 
than those oC conventional neigh?orhoods is an empirical question, the ansQer to Qhich depends 
on local conteMt. MarSetRdriven cities tend to Cilter people ?B income or race into QellRdeCined 
areas. Micro regulation through private covenants and eMclusionarB [oning Curther increases 
segregation. ^et Los Lngeles gated communities are availa?le Qithin everB marSet segment 
JFigure 3K. 6hile the maVoritB is located Qithin upperR or middleRclass Qhite areas, 20_ oC the 
surveBed communities Qere located Qithin middleR and loQerRincome Lsian or Pispanic 
neigh?orhoods, Qhich proliCerate in the northern parts oC %range /ountB and San Fernando 
`alleB JLe $oiM 2003, 2002K. This illustrates the diversitB oC the gated communitB phenomenon, 
as Sanche[ and Lang also document J2003, 200aK using a nationQide sample oC census data. 
/ontrarB to popular conceptions, gated communities are not solelB composed oC QealthB, Qhite 
and retired residentsb ?uBers oC various classes seeS to purchase homes in clu??ed 
neigh?orhoods.   
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this >aB not alLaBs be possible, and Lhere the Aated develop>ent is larAe eno-Ah, the area 
eCCect >aB not act as a disincentive to b-Bers5 &n addition, it is >ore liOelB that a larAe, hiAhPend 
/&Q develop>ent Lo-ld locate near loLerPinco>e neiAhbors than -pperPclass sinAlePCa>ilB 
ho>es5 R-nicipalities oCten enco-raAe these AentriCBinA actions, Lhich increase the local taS 
base5 /onseT-entlB, Aated develop>ents have a poLerC-l abilitB to sort people into preCerenceP
related Aro-ps and to intensiCB inco>ePrelated and stat-s diCCerentiation5  
 
Qata Cro> the 2000 /ens-s shoLs that AatinA increases social and econo>ic seAreAation J!e 
$oiS 2005K5 The co>bined eCCects oC propertB val-es and co>>-nitB socioPecono>ic str-ct-re 
create D5V ti>es >ore seAreAation betLeen Aated develop>entsW blocO Aro-ps and ab-ttinA areas 
than in nonPAated neiAhborhoods5 8econdlB, Aated co>>-nities are 25V ti>es >ore liOelB to be 
seAreAated bB aAe Cro> adXacent areas than other neiAhborhoods5 &ndeed, Aated develop>ents 
attract >iddlePaAed people and seniors, Lho desire to protect the liCeti>e invest>ent capitalized 
in their ho>e5 ZinallB, the eCCect oC race or ethnicitB >-st be analBzed careC-llB: CindinAs shoL 
that Aated co>>-nities do not AenerallB create \Lorlds apartW5 ]ll else beinA eT-al, Aated 
co>>-nities are 255 ti>es less liOelB to be seAreAated bB race or ethnicitB than other reAions oC 
the citB J!e $oiS 2005K5 ^evertheless, ZiA-re 3 shoLs that >anB Aated co>>-nities locate 
Lithin ethnicallB ho>oAeneo-s neiAhborhoods5 RanB developers, concerned that diversitB >aB 
deter potential b-Bers, intentionallB locate in these areas5 
 
&n s->, the evidence on the seAreAation eCCects oC Aated co>>-nities is >iSed5 While in so>e 
circ->stances theB >aB enco-raAe invest>ent in poor neiAhborhoods and Cacilitate the 
C-nctional econo>ic inteAration betLeen inco>e Aro-ps, in others theB >aB reinCorce historic 
seAreAation patterns5  
 
Local interaction e//ects 
 
&n theorB and practice, the spillover eCCects oC p-blicPprivate transactions oCten Cavors Aated 
co>>-nitB residents and their propertB val-es at the eSpense oC adXacent, nonPAated 
neiAhborhoods5 
 
7B phBsicallB blocOinA an area, AatinA >aB increase conAestion and noise on neiAhborinA streets 
J7-rOe and 8ebalB 200DK5 &n addition, internal propertB and ho>eoLner behavior reA-lations 
>aB create propertB pre>i->s Lithin Aated develop>ents Lhile red-cinA the val-e oC nonPAated, 
adXacent properties J7ible and _sieh 200D` !aco-rP!ittle and Ralpezzi 200D` !e $oiS 2002K5 
_oLever, neiAhborinA properties >aB also enXoB increased prestiAe and val-e5 ThereCore Le 
s-AAest ca-tion once aAain abo-t Aeneralizations in this respect5 R-ch depends on eSternal, 
reAional Cactors, s-ch as the nat-re oC the local ho-sinA >arOet5 Where there is an eScess oC 
>iddlePinco>e ho-sinA, Cor eSa>ple, an e>erAent Aated neiAhborhood >arOet >aB deClate the 
val-es oC neiAhborinA, >iddlePclass ho>es5 This is also evident in Laves oC ho-se or oCCice 
b-ildinA and is not necessarilB a pec-liar eCCect oC AatinA5 %n the other hand, iC >iddle inco>e 
ho>es are in short s-pplB, a Aated develop>ent in a deterioratinA neiAhborhood >aB Lell -pliCt 
the val-e oC nonPAated properties, brinAinA the> into >ore val-able -se5 
 
$ated co>>-nities >aB also divert cri>e onto neiAhborinA properties5 ]s LidelB disc-ssed, 
Aated co>>-nities proliCerate Lithin a cli>ate oC AroLinA sec-ritB concerns5 &n ]rAentina, 
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an. compliance Mit0 lan. -se reA-lations an. restrictiNe coNenants. 90ese minimal cities also 
re.-ce operation costs ?B contractinA Mit0 t0e co-ntB an. ot0er p-?lic aAencies to s-pplB p-?lic 
serNices, s-c0 as police, Mater, seMers an. fire JOiller DPQDK. &nstea. of actinA as a separate 
entitB, minimal cities are extensions of t0eir S%Ts.  
 
90e incorporation of t0e Aate. comm-nitB of !eis-re 6orl. as t0e /itB of !aA-na 6oo.s is a 
pec-liar case. Ts t0e larAest Aate. retirement comm-nitB of t0e 6est /oast, incorporation Mas 
necessarB ?eca-se of t0e lacU of actiNe resi.ent inNolNement in t0e operations of t0e 0olden Rain 
Foundation Jt0e master association of t0e comm-nitBK. 8eNeral reAeneration proVects 0a. ?een 
consi.ere. since DPIW, ?-t Mere neNer passe.. Tfter %ranAe /o-ntB force. its ?anUr-ptcB in 
DPPQ, t0e sit-ation c0anAe. ra.icallB. 90e /o-ntB enco-raAe. -r?aniXe. areas to incorporate an. 
propose. t0at neM minimal cities s0o-l. -se t0e local taxY?ase to s-pplB t0e resi.ents Mit0 
improNe. p-?lic serNices, contractinA Mit0 t0e /o-ntB for ?asic serNices. !eis-re 6orl. 0a. 
seNeral options. %ne Mas a Voint incorporation Mit0 near?B comm-nities 0o-sinA Bo-nAer 
pop-lations in !aA-na Sills or Oission ZieVo. 90is option Mas reVecte. ?eca-se of t0e o?Nio-s 
.iNerAence of interest ?etMeen a Bo-nA pop-lation intereste. in p-?lic e.-cation an. a 
retirement comm-nitB. Tnot0er option Mas to ?e annexe. ?B t0e larAe m-nicipalitB of &rNine, ?-t 
t0is AaNe rise to anot0er conflict t0at 0elpe. to maUe t0e .ecision. &rNine s-pporte. a proVect for 
an international airport, ?-t t0e approac0 pat0 Mo-l. 0aNe crosse. oNer !eis-re 6orl.. 
Tccor.inA to )o?ert )inA, resi.ents felt incorporation ?B itself Y t0e t0ir. option Y co-l. ?e -se. 
to fiA0t t0e &nternational Tirport proVect in "l 9oro. &ncorporation also alloMe. t0e priNate 
AoNernment ?etter access to rentYseeUinA strateAies.
DH
 9a?le 2 analBXes some of t0ese in recentlB 
incorporate. !os TnAeles area m-nicipalities t0at are pre.ominatelB compose. of Aate. 
comm-nities. &t s-AAests t0at ?B incorporatinA, local lea.ers seeU [ 
Y to preNent t0eir -pscale fiscal ?asis from ?einA re.istri?-te. in ot0er JpoorerK areas, a common 
Aoal in incorporation .riNen ?B -pscale \.8. .eNelopments JO&!!") DPQDK] 
Y to leAallB transfer p-?lic reso-rces an. assets for t0e profit of excl-siNe an. enclose. 
neiA0?or0oo.s ] 
Y to leAallB o?tain p-?lic infrastr-ct-re financinA Mit0in Aate. areas J!" $%&' 2HH^K.  
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e 0rdinary trans;ers o; ^urisdiction ;rom the county to the incorporated municipalities are : police and ;ire department, 
planninH and SuildinH permits. 
 
At the end of the 1990s, Leisure 6orld's obsolescence had reached a critical levelP it needed a 
long-term renewal strategy. For example, according to a 2001 report to the POA
11
, W6X of the 
housing units did not fit the safety requirements for heating and electrical systems and Z2X did 
not provide enough square footage compared to contemporary standards. Electrical, water, 
telephone and sewage systems were between 2[ and 36 years old and needed to be replaced. 
Shifts in Leisure 6orld\s property values also indicated its decline. Although during the 19W0s 
average annual change was 1[.1X, a rate equivalent to adjacent tracts, during the 1990s values 
depreciated. In this context, homeowners were unable to pay to maintain the gates, sewage 
system, lighting, and walls--improvements totaling over 31 million dollars (more than five 
million dollars over their annual budget). In this case, private governance provided public goods 
far less efficiently than standard non-gated developments in the vicinity. 9he club economy 
failed, demonstrating that gated communities often require public sector subsidy or must become 
incorporated cities to subsist. Indeed, in 1999 Leisure 6orld incorporated as the city of Laguna 
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innovations to turn eMternalities into marNets. Oet Pithout state intervention( theB Pill ignore 
conseQuences ?eBond their paB?acN period. %n the other hand( through overregulation( localities 
maB lose the Ceatures oC private neigh?orhoods that maB help maNe cities more sustaina?le.  
 
Private ur?an governance is dependent on pu?lic su?sidB and national laPs. 6ithout these 
conditions( it Pill degenerate under costlB competition Cought out in pu?lic and private courts. &t 
also needs to coordinate Pith pu?lic government in the provision oC higher level civic goods and 
services. The alternative is Cor small private neigh?orhoods to Cederate( ?ut this leads to an 
outcome resem?ling pu?lic government ?B incorporation. Tt the heart oC the issue is the 
sustaina?le division oC responsi?ilities ?etPeen private and pu?lic governments. U%T contracts 
are inevita?lB incomplete and reQuire pu?lic underPriting. LaPmaNers and policB maNers Pill 
have to manage risNs ?B mitigating social costs and contri?uting to redistri?utive taMation( thus 
shaping a more eQuita?le outcome. 
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1 Unless otherZise noted( ?B sustaina?ilitB( Ze mean political( Cinancial and environmental sustaina?ilitB. This is indeed the 
usual meaning Cound in reports and researches on cities and sustaina?le development( U\ /onCerence on fuman 8ettlements 




G The data?ase is ?ased on a set oC G1O gated communities ?uilt ?eCore G000 and located in P counties oC the Los Vngeles area 
JLos Vngeles( Riverside( %range( gentura( 8an 7ernardino( 8anta 7ar?ara and 8an DiegoK. This data?ase is derived Crom the 
same sources that a prospective home?uBer Zould use Jrealtors` listings( advertisementsK and Zas supplemented Zith materials 
Crom intervieZs Zith local oCCicials( as Zell as data Crom assessment maps and the G000 /ensus. 
 
 
3 V clu? good is a categorB oC good Jor service or resourceK distinguished in the economics literature Crom a private good on the 
one hand and a pu?lic good on the other. &t is similar to the idea oC a local pu?lic good and the terms overlap in meaning. /lu? 
goods are collectivelB consumed( lice pu?lic goods( ?ut ?B a Cinite set oC consumers. TheoreticallB( a pu?lic good is capa?le oC 
?eing consumed Zithout congestion ?B an inCinite set oC coQconsumers. Vn economic clu? Jan organiaation supplBing a clu? 
goodK maB ?e organiaed ?B an entrepreneur or government. 6here distance or culture create ?arriers to consumption( clu?s maB 
Corm spontaneouslB Jhere is the overlap Zith the idea oC local pu?lic goodsK. The ?ig thing a?out clu?s is that theB permit coQ
consumed goods to ?e supplied eCCicientlB – ?B the organiaers edercising control over JaK the num?er oC consumers and J?K the 
juantitB and jualitB oC the good. /lu?s edercise such control via mem?ership rules and Cees. 8ee /ornes R and 8anders T J1OOIK 
The theorB oC edternalities( pu?lic goods and clu? goods. /am?ridgeN /UP( Cor a heavB dutB introduction to the economic theorB 
oC clu?s and 6e?ster / and Lai L6/ JG003K PropertB rights( planning and marcets( \orthampton YV and /heltenham UUN 
EdZard Elgar( Cor an application to ur?an theorB
 
 
R 7iologist $arrett fardin suggested in his seminal 1OI8 article on the tragedB oC the commons( that kVs a rational ?eing( each 
herdsman seecs to madimise his gain. EdplicitlB or implicitlB( more or less consciouslB( he ascs( k6hat is the utilitB to me oC 
adding one more animal to mB herdlm This utilitB has one negative and one positive component. 1. The positive component is a 
Cunction oC the increment oC one animal. 8ince the herdsman receives all the proceeds Crom the sale oC the additional animal( the 
positive utilitB is nearlB n1. G. The negative component is a Cunction oC the additional overgraaing created ?B one more animal. 
8ince( hoZever( the eCCects oC overgraaing are shared ?B all the herdsmen( the negative utilitB Cor anB particular decisionQmacing 
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10 LRent seeMingN reCers to ?ehavior Phere?B an individual( Cirm or government seeMs to o?tain ?eneCit ?B manipulating the 
economic and political environment rather than through productive Pealth creation and trade.
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